# Standalone backend infrastructure This Compose project is the local data plane for the standalone Sauci API. It does not run Supabase services. Supabase remains the hosted identity provider; the API verifies its access tokens and owns all application data access. Use `scripts/dev-local.sh` rather than invoking Compose directly. PostgreSQL is bound to loopback and persists in the `sauci-local_sauci-postgres-data` volume. The committed credentials are deliberately local-only and must not be reused by a deployed environment. Private media is stored on the API's `media-data` volume. Mobile clients upload with bearer authentication, persist opaque `media:` references, and ask the API for short-lived signed read URLs. The public content route accepts only a valid unexpired HMAC capability; it never exposes directory paths. ## Dokploy deployment contract `compose.production.yaml` is a deployment-ready baseline containing the Node API and worker, PostgreSQL, and a one-shot migration service. Configure Dokploy to build the Compose file from the repository root and route the public API hostname to the `api` service on port `3003`. Do not publish PostgreSQL. Create separate Dokploy Compose applications for `staging` and `main`, both using `infra/backend/compose.production.yaml`; enable push-triggered auto-deploy for their respective branch. The file intentionally omits a top-level Compose project name so Dokploy isolates networks and named volumes per application. See [`docs/operations/backend-deployments.md`](../../docs/operations/backend-deployments.md) for the promotion contract. Copy the variable names from `.env.production.example` into Dokploy's secret configuration. `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` and the password embedded (URL encoded) in `DATABASE_URL` must match. Generate them for the deployment; never reuse the committed local password. The API needs only the hosted Supabase Auth URL to discover its issuer and JWKS endpoint. The server-only service-role key is used solely by the hosted Auth Admin deletion endpoint; it must never reach a client or be used for application data or Storage access. The backend must not receive a Supabase anon key, database password, or direct Supabase Storage connection. Administrative automation uses a separate opaque credential pair. Configure `ADMIN_API_SERVICE_TOKEN` and `ADMIN_API_SERVICE_USER_ID` on the API together; the UUID must resolve to an active, least-privilege `admin_users` row imported or created in the standalone database. Configure MCP with the same token under the different name `SAUCI_ADMIN_API_TOKEN` plus its independent caller-facing `SAUCI_MCP_API_KEY`. The token does not confer Supabase authority: the API maps it to the configured administrator and applies normal permissions and auditing. Do not give either admin token to mobile, admin browser, or worker containers. An environment without an imported active administrator may leave both values empty; customer API routes still run, while MCP service authentication remains disabled until the pair is configured. RevenueCat credentials are likewise optional at infrastructure bootstrap, but purchase verification, webhooks, and account-deletion provider cleanup remain unavailable until their dedicated server-side credentials are installed. Secret ownership is intentionally split: | Secret | API | Worker | MCP | |---|:---:|:---:|:---:| | Hosted Auth service-role key | yes, Auth Admin only | no | no | | RevenueCat API/webhook secrets | yes | no | no | | Admin API service token | yes | no | yes, as `SAUCI_ADMIN_API_TOKEN` | | OpenRouter/Discord worker credentials | no | yes | no | | PostgreSQL/media signing configuration | yes | yes | no | On each deployment, `migrate` waits for PostgreSQL, takes a PostgreSQL advisory lock, applies the committed `apps/api/drizzle` migrations, and exits. The `api` service starts only after migration succeeds. A failed migration therefore fails closed instead of starting new application code against an old schema. The image also exposes the same operation as: ```sh node dist/db/migrate.js ``` The container runs as the unprivileged `node` user with a read-only filesystem, dropped Linux capabilities, an init process, and bounded graceful shutdown. Docker checks `/health/live`; Dokploy should use `/health/ready` for routing so traffic is admitted only when PostgreSQL is reachable. Before the first deployment, provide: 1. The API hostname and TLS route. 2. Persistent Dokploy volumes for `postgres-data` and `media-data`, with one coordinated backup/restore policy covering both. 3. The hosted Supabase project URL and expected JWT audience. 4. Fresh PostgreSQL credentials stored only in Dokploy secrets. 5. A rollback and restore point before any migrated production data is imported. 6. A separately generated `MEDIA_SIGNING_SECRET` (at least 32 characters) and the HTTPS API origin as `MEDIA_PUBLIC_BASE_URL`. 7. A non-production hosted Auth project and disposable, onboarding-complete test identities mapped into the staging database for authenticated mobile acceptance. Blob deletion is retryable. Database cascades and avatar replacement enqueue the server-generated storage key in `media_deletion_queue`; the operations worker removes the file and acknowledges the queue row only after a successful deletion (missing files are treated as already removed). Failed metadata transactions remove the newly written file immediately. Operators should alert on an old/growing deletion queue and include it in database backups; never delete files by constructing paths outside this lifecycle. The worker also leases notification, moderation, and optional Discord jobs from `operations_outbox`. Jobs are retried with bounded exponential backoff and are not selected again after five attempts. Alert on rows that remain unsent after five attempts; investigate and replay them explicitly rather than deleting the idempotency record or blindly retrying provider calls. Validate configuration without starting anything: ```sh docker compose --env-file infra/backend/.env.production.local \ -f infra/backend/compose.production.yaml config ``` Run the repeatable disposable container check before changing the Dokploy application. It uses hard-coded test-only credentials, creates a unique Compose project, verifies migration/startup/security/shutdown behaviour, and removes its volume on exit: ```sh infra/backend/verify-production.sh ``` Do not point this Compose project at an existing production database during local validation. Validate against a disposable local volume first. Production cutover additionally requires a stopped-source final sync, row/count checks, legacy-media-reference checks, and authenticated mobile behaviour checks against the non-production fixture; container health alone is not proof of a successful migration.